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CASE NOTES
cent years in North Carolina and other States outlawing the practice of
optical kickbacks, 24 but this did not affect its decision, since it was con-
cerned with public policy as it existed in 1943 and 1944, when the kick-
backs were made.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Lilly case, the Tax Court
has had occasion to pass upon the deductibility of secret payments in the
nature of bribes or graft made by one company to the purchasing agent
of another company in order to procure a contract. 25 In deciding that the
payments were not deductible, the court avoided the question of public
policy and made a factual finding that the payments were not to be re-
garded as normal, usual, nor customary in the business world, or "such as
were allowable in Lilly v. Commissioner."26
The Tax Court apparently was on safe ground in this instance, since the
Supreme Court has previously said that the question of whether an ex-
pense is directly related to a business and whether it is ordinary and nec-
essary are doubtless pure questions of fact in most instances, and that a
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 27 on these issues should not be re-
versed by the federal appellate courts, except where a question of law
is unmistakably involved.28
On the related question of fee-splitting by surgeons, which the Com-
missioner had been inclined to treat in the same manner as the kickbacks
in the Lilly case, a new position was assumed which gave recognition to
the policy enunciated by the Supreme Court. This new position was set
forth in a Bureau ruling29 to the effect that payments by surgeons under
split-fee arrangements would be deductible where they complied sub-
stantially with the tests laid down in the Lilly case.
TORTS-WIFE ENTITLED TO SUE SPOUSE
FOR PERSONAL INJURY
The plaintiff alleged that while she was riding as a guest in the car of
the defendant, her husband, he wilfully and wantonly collided with an-
other car, causing injuries to her. The parties were subsequently divorced.
The wife brought this tort action which was dismissed in the Superior
Court. The Appellate Court affirmed that decision.' The Illinois Supreme
24N.C. Laws (1951) c. 1089, §§ 21, 23; Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§ 10185-14; Deering's Cal. Business and Professions Code (1951) SS 650, 652.
25 Estate of Lashells, 11 T.C.M. 274 (1952), 52, 086 P-H MEMO T.C. (1952).
26Estate of Lashells, 11 T.C.M. 274 (1952), 52, 086 P-H MEMO T.C. (1952).
27The Board of Tax Appeals was redesignated the Tax Court of the United
States by Act October 21, 1942, ch. 619, title V., S 504, 56 Stat. 957.
'.8 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
29 I.T. 4096, 1952 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 18, at 3 (1952).
1 Brandt v. Keller, 347 111. App. 18, 105 N.E. 2d 796 (1952).
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Court, two judges dissenting, reversed the Appellate Court and held that
under the Married Women's Act of 18742 the plaintiff was authorized
to bring such an action. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E. 2d 729
(1952).
This case represents the first time that the Illinois courts have been
called upon to decide whether the 1874 Married Women's Act confers
upon the wife the right to sue her husband for a personal tort.
At common law a married woman could not sue anyone. She was com-
pletely dependent upon her husband to enforce her rights. It was held
that husband and wife could not sue each other because they were con-
sidered one person, and one cannot sue himself.3 Gradually the rights of a
married woman were extended by courts of equity and statutory enact-
ments. An Illinois act of 18614 allowed a wife to acquire and convey her
own property. This statute was held to include the right to bring suits
in her own name without joining her husband for unlawful interference
with her property, even against her husband.5
The decision in the present case is based on an interpretation of Sec-
tion. 1 of the Married Women's Act of 1874:
That a married woman, may in all cases, sue and be sued without joining
her husband with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried, and an
attachment or judgment in such action may be enforced by or against her as if
she were a single woman.6
The court held that the phrase "in all cases" was to be construed literally,
and that the legislative intent was to remove all of the married woman's
common law disabilities with regard to suing and being sued.
The court followed the reasoning of Welch v. Davis,7 stating that the
common law obstacles in suits by married women no longer exist because
by statute a wife may own property independently of her husband and
may bring suit in her own name; it would no longer be a circuitous action
in which the property would return to her husband.
The court also stated that the public policy reason for denying a tort
action between spouses was without merit. It noted that when one spouse
assails another with a suit there is not much domestic tranquility left to
disrupt, and the conjugal peace is just as seriously jarred by other allow-
able actions, i.e., property and contract actions.8
In answer to the Appellate Court's interpretation of the 1874 Statute
2111. Rev. Star. (1951) c. 68, § 1.
8Chestnut v. Chestnut, 77 111. 346 (1875).
411l. Pub. Law (1861) p. 143.
5 Emerson v. Clayton, 32 I11. 493 (1863).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, § 1.
7410 I11. 130, 101 N.E. 2d 547 (1951).
SThomas v. Mueller, 106 I11. 36 (1883); Martin v. Robson, 65 11. 129 (1872).
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that the emphasis should be placed on the phrase "without joining her
husband," the court here said that acts of 1861 and 1869 already were in-
terpreted to permit a married woman to sue her husband, as well as third
parties, without joining him in property actions." Thus the court assumed
that the legislature intended to extend her rights by the 1874 Act.
The Illinois court further reasoned that since the court had already
authorized a wife to sue her husband in contract 10 without any express
authority other than the general words relied upon in this case (a married
woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued)," she should also be able to
sue her husband in tort. The statute could not be construed to remove the
common law immunity for contract purposes and preserve it for another
purpose, i.e., tort.
The principal Appellate Court reasons are worthy of note. The court
said: 1. that the words "without joining her husband" emphasize the
joinder of the husband as the major legislative concern; 2. that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed; 3. that the
primary rule in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative
intent, considering the conditions, evils, and injustices sought to be cor-
rected; 4. that the whole act is concerned with the disabilities of wives
as distinguished from spouses to effect the object of equality and not
to remove the common law immunities between them; 5. that since in
seventy-seven years following the passage of the act no similar suit had
been brought, it was fair to conclude from this fact that the consensus of
opinion of all who had to deal with the matter, lawyers, judges, and
others, was that interspousal suits in personal tort were not allowed by
the statute. 12
Thus there are good arguments on both sides of the issue. However,
in view of the language of the statute and the' steady development in
women's rights from property to contracts, the advance from contracts
to torts is a fair extension, and the logic of the Illinois Supreme Court
cannot be denied.
It is interesting to note two decisions that are not in accord with this
decision. In Thompson v. Thompson'3 the United States Supreme Court
held for purely public policy reasons that a District of Columbia Statute
authorizing women "to sue separately in tort as fully as if unmarried"
did not authorize a tort suit against a spouse. In Buckeye v. Buckeye
1 4
the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied Illinois law in a tort action and
9 Martin v. Robson, 65 M1. 129 (1872).
10 Thomas v. Mueller, 106 Ill. 36 (1883).
11ll. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, S 1.
12 Brandt v. Keller, 347 Ill. App. 18, 105 N.E. 2d 796 (1952).
'3 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
14 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
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held that the common law immunity remained in spite of the 1874
Statute. That court relied mainly on the case of Merrill v. Marshall5
in which the Illinois Appellate Court said that the common law unity
of husband and wife was not changed by the statute to make them sub-
ject to a civil conspiracy charge.
The present court recognized that the majority of courts are contrary
to the holding in this case. However, Illinois now sides with a growing
minority and a possible modern trend.' It is important to remember that
the question is essentially one of statutory construction.
Of much importance are the implications involved in the present case.
Will the rule be confined to wilful and wanton torts as are involved in
the reported case? Apparently not from the liberal language of the court
giving literal interpretation to the phrase "in all cases." It is interesting
to note that the court made no further references to the words "wilful
and wanton" other than in the statement of the facts of the case. Other
concurring jurisdictions have not limited such an action to wilful and
wanton torts.17
A serious sociological problem is also involved. There is certainly a
much greater threat to domestic tranquility by allowing tort actions
than other actions. Seldom do spouses have occasion to instigate criminal
prosecutions, contract and property actions in comparison to the oppor-
tunities they have to sue each other in tort.
A question arises as to whether a husband may sue his wife for tort
under the Married Women's Act of 1874.18 Other courts with similar
statutes have held that such a suit is not allowed unless by express
statute.1" It is also interesting to note that for public policy reasons
sister states may refuse to entertain any such domestic actions.2 0
In the most common type of cases involving automobile accidents, the
insurance companies representing the defendant will be faced with the
problem of collusion between husband and wife.
15113 I11. App. 447 (1904).
16 Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 14 N.W. 2d 43 (1944); Coster v. Coster, 289
N.Y. 438, 46 N.E. 2d 509 (1943); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.V. 266
(1941); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146, 9 A. 2d 812 (1939); Courtncy v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660 (1938); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo, 19, 46 P. 2d
740 (1935); Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg,
183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W. 2d 696 (1931); Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9
(1923); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920); Johnson v. Johnson,
201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
17 Singer v. Singer, 245 Vis. 191, 14 N.W. 2d 43 (1944); Courmey v. Courtney,
184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660 (1938); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. 2d 740 (1935).
18 I11. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, § 1.
19 Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E. 2d 350 (1949); Singer v. Singer,
245 Wis. 191, 14 N.W. 2d 43 (1944).
20 Poling v. Poling, 116 \V.Va. 187, 179 S.F. 604 (1935).
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It appears likely that the Illinois courts will soon be called upon to
decide whether or not a wife may sue her estranged husband in the tort
action of rape.2 1 The action is being brought on the authority of our
present decision. It seems inconceivable that the Illinois courts will sus-
tain any such action. Our present decision cannot be cited as a precedent
authorizing the courts to completely disregard all marital privileges.
However, it must be concluded that our present decision has opened
the way in Illinois to a new body of tort law which will certainly bring
many more interspousal disputes into the courts, especially where the
parties are divorced at the time of bringing suit as in the present case.
LABOR LAW-RIGHT TO COMPEL REDELIVERY OF
UNION SHOP CARD
Plaintiff, a local barbers' union, sought to compel the redelivery of a
union shop card which had been supplied to the defendant, a barber shop
proprietor. The shop card identified defendant's place of business as a
"union shop" and it had been accepted by the defendant as union prop-
erty subject to recall for violation of union rules. Defendant was not
only an employer of other barbers, but he also worked as a barber in his
own shop. The union brought this suit to recover the shop card on the
grounds that the defendant refused to join the union and pay dues as a
"non-active member," such refusal being in violation of union rules.1
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed the suit and re-
fused to compel return of the card. Di Leo v. Daneault, 109 N.E. 2d 824
(Mass., 1953).
The Di Leo case represents the latest interpretation of a provision re-
cently added to the constitution of the International Barbers' Union.2
The constitutional provision requires that proprietors working "with
the tools of the trade," join the union as "non-active" or "proprietor"
members. Such a "non-active" membership would require the proprietor
21Chicago Daily Sun-Times § 1, p. 3, col. 3 (Feb. 11, 1953).
I For decisions holding that an attempt to unionize employers is a lawful and
proper labor objective see: Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293
(1943); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. 2d 12 (1947); Coons v. Journeymen
Barbers, Etc., 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W. 2d 345 (1946); Naprawa v. Chicago Flat
Janitors' Union, 315 I11. App. 328, 43 N.E. 2d 198 (1942); Swing v. A.F. of L.,
298 Ill. App. 63, 18 N.E. 2d 258 (1938).
Contra: Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs,
331 111. App. 129, 72 N.E. 2d 635 (1947); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union,
377 Il1. 76, 35 N.E. 2d 349 (1941); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, 371 111. 377, 21 N.E. 2d 308 (1939); Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n.,
305 I11. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924
(1898); Rest., Torts § 814 (1939).
2 The Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers and Cosmetologists' International Union
of America. This constitutional provision became effective Jan. 1, 1948.
